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Abstract 
To deal with some current debates about the analytic validity of ‘contextual’ 
details in the analysis of talk-in-interaction, we (Alec McHoul and Mark Rapley) 
work through two cases. The first is hypothetical and derives from the current 
literature in speech-act-theory-inspired pragmatics (Capone, 2005). The second is 
actual and arises from our initial disagreement with an earlier publication by one 
of our colleagues (Charles Antaki [1998]). What we hope to show is that the idea 
of context is, itself, something of a moveable feast; that it can have multiple 
formations ranging from the broadly political to the almost-but-not-quite effect of 
surface texts and their sequential implications. In this respect, we hope to ease 
tensions between otherwise cognate approaches to the analysis of talk-in-
interaction. Our argument is that, if context is hearable in the talk as such, then it 
cannot be ignored by analysts. In the third section of the paper (and precisely so 
as not to make this a ‘contestation’), Charles responds in his own terms and to see 
what kind of mutual footing there may (or may not) be for all involved in the 
analysis of talk vis-à-vis questions of context. If there is an upshot of the paper as 
a whole it is that further work on the ‘context question’ in studies of talk-in-
interaction could well entail a return to (and perhaps a respecification of) the foundational ethnomethodological question of the status of ‘members’ 
knowledge’. 
 
 
You Gotta Light?: 
On the Luxury of Context for Understanding Talk in Interaction 
 
 
1. Contextual Background and Capone’s Gloss 
 
In recent years, there have been a number of quite celebrated debates in 
conversation and discourse analysis (CA/DA) about the relevance of contextual 
information for understanding stretches of talk.1 Briefly, and at the risk of 
oversimplification, the key protagonists propose two more-or-less 
incommensurable positions. Firstly, those favouring one variety or another of 
what we can respectfully call ‘sequential purism’ contend that the notion of 
‘context’ is so highly overdetermined as to offer nothing but an indefinite regress 
of analytic glosses, with no principled manner of reaching an empirically secure 
determination of the locally relevant aspects of a conversational scene (see Antaki, 
1998; Potter, 1998; Schegloff, 1997, 1998, 1999a,b).  Secondly, those who may claim 
allegiance to critical discourse analysis or versions of critical realism contend that 
those aspects of ‘context’ which are essential to comprehending talk-in-interaction 
(and which most frequently come in the guise of the usual macro-sociological 
suspects: racism, heterosexism, disablism, and so forth) — are not only 
accountably deleted by the sequential purists, but are also identifiable, a priori, by 
otherwise astute and socio-politically committed analysts (see Fairclough, 1992; 
Parker, 1992; Parker & Burman, 1993; Willig, 1999). Leaving to one side attempts 
to marry discourse analysis and cognitive psychology (e.g. Van Dijk, 1999), 
between the pro- and anti-context polarities some have attempted to outline a 
                                                 
1 We note, however, that recent discussions are in many ways recapitulations of earlier 
debates in ethnomethodology (EM). See, for example Heritage (1984) and Wieder (1974). middle way; a way of eschewing ‘either-or’ thinking in favour of a ‘both-and’ 
approach: that is to say, a way of reading ethnomethodology (EM) generally, and 
CA in particular, in terms of either rhetorical analysis or post-structuralist 
thought, and vice versa (see Billig, 1999a,b; Rapley, 2004; Wetherell, 1998; 1999). In 
this respect, Mey’s consideration of the co-dependence of what he calls “co-text” 
and context remains instructive (Mey, 1999: 181–191). 
 
Alessandro Capone (2005) poses an interesting puzzle for these debates about the 
relevance of contextual information for analytic understandings of stretches of 
talk. He writes: 
 
Two persons meet in the street. They know each other. Once they were 
friends; then they stopped being on speaking terms. One of them talks to 
the other. We need not know the specific literal content of his utterance. 
However, we know how to understand his message — it counts as an 
attempt to resume the old friendship. (Capone, 2005: 1355-1356) 
 
The upshot of what we might call ‘Capone’s gloss’ is that the understanding of a 
stretch of talk is not always available from the literality of the transcript as such — 
pace some of the above-mentioned positions within CA. It can be just as much or 
equally in the scene, its history, how the participants stand with respect to each 
other, and so forth, through a long list of possible contextual — perhaps even 
biographical —specifics. The basic message of ethnomethodology (EM) from its 
earliest days has always been: each mutually informs the other. The specific, in 
situ, context makes the utterance make sense and the utterance is (at least partly) 
constitutive of that local scene. Context (or scene) then can’t be forgotten as part 
of the overall reflexive equation — though, as we will see, it need not be the only 
weapon in the analyst’s arsenal. 
 So, on the other hand, and equally importantly, the ‘sequence grammar’ (Sacks, 
1970) of a stretch of talk can tell us much about the scene. Compare hypothetical 
instances of Capone’s gloss:2 
 
*Materials 1 
 
A: You gotta light? 
B: F*** off you! ((stares A down)) 
A: ((walks away)) 
 
A: You gotta light? 
B: Still not talking. 
 
A: You gotta light? 
((long pause)) 
B: Yeh sure ((offers light)) ’bout time we made up, eh? 
 
A: You gotta light? 
B: John, me old mate! Sure! 
 
In any of these cases, each second (return) utterance can give us some pretty good 
clues as to the kind of scene we’re dealing with.3 Put shortly: if the first utterance 
could be an “attempt to resume the old friendship”, the second is more or less 
limited to acceptance or refusal.4 Upon finding (say, in a transcript) something 
                                                 
2 The asterisk shows invented or hypothetical data. In the second section of this paper we 
will consider a case from an actual instance of talk-in-interaction. 
3 Note that Capone does not consider possible return utterances. In this respect, he is not 
so much interested in how a conversation proceeds as in giving an example of a 
somewhat humorous story. Capone deals with a more obviously conversational instance 
in a later paper (Capone, 2006). 
4 Here we must write “if...” because, despite Capone’s insistence, it is possible that the 
first speaker could begin with an utterance much less benignly open to being an offer 
than “You gotta light?”. As the instance is hypothetical — for both Capone and ourselves hearable as an acceptance or a refusal, we can hear the utterance before as an offer 
of some sort. The exact contextual standing of the participants is not directly 
written on the surface of the paired utterances; but it is not so far from our 
analytic grasp on a purely sequentialist reading. It is also the case that, at least in 
Anglophone cultures, if the first utterance is to be an “attempt to resume the old 
friendship”, it could not but be of the ‘pick up line’ variety of pre-request such as 
“You gotta light?”, or “Is that today’s Times?” which can propose much more than 
the simple provision of a match or a newspaper.5 
 
So, in these hypothetical examples, we have a nice analytic question on our hands. 
That is, the first utterance, in each case, is formally formed as a request (for a light), 
but turns out, after the second utterance, to be retrospectively hearable as an offer 
(to resume a friendship). The speech-acts of offer and request are, if not quite 
antithetical to one another, then at least formally distinct. Offers propose giving 
something while requests want something to be given. 
 
As a caution we should note that offers and requests nevertheless have one thing 
in common: both can be accepted or rejected. But acceptances and rejections of 
offers are quite different and distinct from acceptances and rejections of requests. 
That is, typical acceptances or rejections of requests, as opposed to offers, would 
run much more along the following lines (to repeat our example): 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
— we could imagine any number of openings that would actually deepen the division 
between the two (ex) friends rather than offering an olive branch.  
5 Our thanks to Susan Hansen for this point. On another note, one of the reviewers of this 
paper for Journal of Pragmatics speculates as follows — with some slight alterations by the 
present authors not affecting the overall sense of the comment: 
I would think that, in Romance cultures, utterances such as “Have you gotta light?” 
are not very efficient for resuming friendships. For settling serious quarrels, more 
serious utterances that seem to attend to very serious business would do the job best. 
For example, after ten years, John phones his sister: “Hi, this is John. Dad’s dead”. I 
am not completely persuaded that Anglophone cultures are so very different. If they 
are, much could be said in a further paper. 
We are contemplating such a comparative analysis and, should the anonymous reviewer 
care to be involved in the project, we would be pleased to collaborate with her or him. *Materials 2 
 
A: You gotta light? 
B: Sorry, I don’t smoke. 
 
A: You gotta light? 
B: Sure ((takes out lighter and lights A’s cigarette)) 
 
Still, in our original bunch of cases of offers (*Materials 1), the first turn, “You 
gotta light?”, looks like nothing other than a request. The analyst’s question is 
then: how could what looks like a request on first turn actually turn out to be an 
offer after second turn? Do we need all the florid details of A’s and B’s mutual 
biography to decide? Our response will be that we don’t quite need it (if we have 
the second turns empirically to hand) but it could be an analytic luxury that seals 
the case. 
 
So how is it that we can read utterances like “You gotta light?” as offers rather 
than requests? As we have seen, one way is to turn to what follows them and find 
these ‘seconds’ to be acceptances or rejections of offers rather than as acceptances 
or rejections of requests, each of which, as we have seen are formed quite 
differently. Another means is via a machinery (as Sacks often called it) available 
to pretty much any competent member. That is, pairs of persons such as FRIEND + 
FRIEND are just one instance of a collection of pair-kinds or “standardised 
relational pairs”. Sacks (1972) calls this kind a Collection R. In such a collection, 
each member of the pair is co-equal in terms of any possible exchange. Therefore 
STUDENT + STUDENT is a Collection R while TEACHER + STUDENT is not. Sacks calls 
the latter type of pair a Collection K: where the members of it are not co-equal. 
 
The interesting thing about acceptances (as against rejections) of offers to resume 
friendships is that they re-establish the pair as a Collection R while rejections 
introduce the possibility of a rather peculiar Collection K such as FRIEND + STRANGER. That is: speaker A proposes the resumption of a Collection R which 
previously existed (FRIEND + FRIEND) which B can either take up with an 
acceptance or refuse with a rejection, thereby proposing himself as (continuing to 
be) a stranger despite A’s offer. As ordinary speakers of the language, then, 
equipped in general with the Collection R vs. Collection K distinction, we can 
infer the paired collectional status of the parties so long as we are (minimally) 
given the first and second turns. Accordingly the reasonable inferences about the 
first turn(s) in *Materials 1 are: 
 
1. These two people must know each other; and independently of any name-
based recognition. 
2. Their relation to each other is currently undecidable as to its Collection status. 
3. It may once have been co-equal (Collection R) but has been broken at some 
prior point, thereby coming under the aegis of Collection K. 
4. The offer is very likely aimed at repairing the absence of co-equality — via an 
ordinary request — an attempt to re-establish the pair as a Collection R. 
5. It can then be accepted or refused. 
6. If accepted, Collection R status is resumed. 
7. If rejected, an uneasy Collection K status is continued — uneasy since one of the 
pair wants the pair to have Collection R status while the other does not. 
 
So the sequence grammar — especially in conjunction with commonsense 
knowledge of standardised relational pairs — can get us to a very reasonable 
approximation of the kind of scene this is, indeed of the likely sequential details of 
it, independently of any general (e.g., biographical) context supplied by Capone’s 
gloss.6 On the other hand, if we happen to know in advance what kind of scene 
this is — via ‘extraneous’ contextual knowledge — the niceties of sequential and 
collectional inference effectively disappear. 
 
                                                 
6 Cf. Sacks’s analysis of similar kinds of inference from the relations between utterance 
sequences and the hearable sequentiality of the events they describe. Sacks (1992a: 113). Putting this shortly: there is no point in gazing at single utterances without 
considering their place in their local sequence of utterances, thereby relying 
purely on the context (independently of what was actually uttered) in order to 
understand a stretch of talk. That is, Capone’s gloss is a useful instruction to 
analysts but its indifference to the sequential placement of talked items limits its 
methodological applicability for our purposes. Equally, there is no point in 
relying on a purely sequential analysis if the details of the context happen to be 
independently available in some obviously, i.e., empirically, ascertainable 
manner. 
 
If our goal is to understand and faithfully describe the pragmatics of utterance 
exchange, then we have to assume that the two must mutually inform each other 
— in Garfinkel’s (1967) original sense of reflexivity. For the analyst, then, 
contextual knowledge is by no means necessary but, as a luxury, it need not be 
rejected out of hand if verifiably available. The debates about the relevance of 
context for the understanding of stretches of talk, to date (see above), have been 
couched in somewhat ‘either-or’ terms, as we have noted. For all this, ‘both-and’ 
is not an unreasonable alternative and is not incompatible with formally scientific 
methodology. If zoologists, for example, can mutually analyse both captured 
(filmed and transcribed) instances of animal behaviour and their empirically 
documented environmental determinants and consequences, why should analysts 
of human talk not work in a parallel manner? 
 
Another way of stating our position on this is to say that single utterances (or 
turns) can rarely be particularly interesting — in the analytic sense — in their own 
right. “Have you gotta light?”, to return to the manufactured example that 
Capone’s gloss invites, has multiple analytic possibilities if taken on its own; and 
interpretations of it as ‘request’ or ‘offer’ are only two from a long list of 
possibilities. Capone draws our attention to the ways in which supra-local 
contextual information (the mutual biographies of the interlocutors) can seal the 
analytic reading. Attention to the possible next turns can give us almost (but not quite) the same analytic definiteness about the utterance. But, in another sense, 
inspecting the following turn is but another instance of context in action — except 
that, in this eventuality, we are dependent on purely local context. The conclusion, 
at least for analysts, must then be that context (in some form or other) is 
inevitable. For (transcript-dependent) purists this will be the local sequential 
context. For others it will be the supra-local context — perhaps even to the point 
of going beyond Capone’s biographical information and venturing into the 
broader realm of what might be called ‘politics’. 
 
Either way, very few free-standing utterances can be analytically illuminating. 
Any given instance inevitably depends on one or another version of what can 
very loosely be called ‘context’. How far we extend our analytic conception of 
context, we suspect, depends on the instance in question. But, unless we remain 
with some kind of a ‘unit’ (as per quantitative analysis), one or another version of 
context is inevitable. To show this in the case of some actually videotaped and 
transcribed materials, we will now consider how a single term or name, Fagin, can 
be — and has been — read by analysts. 
 
 
2. Fagin and Friends 
 
Charles Antaki (1998:71) offers an intriguing analysis of an instance of jocular 
identity ascription: “you look like Fagin” — i.e., bedraggled. One possible analytic 
take is that “this sort of identity talk is meant to be non-literal, and therefore — 
apparently — invokes things not there in the recorded talk … [so it] must play on 
‘culture’, and perhaps on people’s ‘private meanings’”. Charles wants to argue 
against this take and writes that what Fagin indexes: 
 
need[s] neither psychological speculation nor cultural interpretation to 
understand it.… [E]ven though the tease seems to invoke the cultural 
nugget of a fictional character name (“Fagin”) the … work it does [an appreciation of a complaint] is hearable and intelligible without resort to 
any sort of ‘cultural’ or ‘psychological’ analysis, where the former means 
something like the interpretation of a code and the latter means the 
evaluation of inner states (p. 71).7 
 
We have no quarrel with Charles’s gloss on the work done here by the utterance 
“you look like Fagin” but note that while, here, identity mis-ascription does 
affiliation via the appreciation of a complaint rather than doing insult (cf. Sacks’s 
analysis of the work done by the kinship misidentification “Yes Mommy” in the 
GTS data), as we have argued elsewhere (McHoul & Rapley 2001), one has to 
know the cultural as well as the sequential rules for the doing of affiliation or insult 
via this device (or in Sacks’s terms, a “cultural machinery”) in order to 
accountably produce the practice as such. 
 
But let us look at Charles’s data. They are prefaced by the following ‘contextual’(!) 
information: that the interaction is “the beginning of one of a number of mundane 
episodes that a colleague of mine videotaped in her home as a favour to me. I 
gave no specific instructions about when or what to tape, nor did I say what I was 
looking for other than (as was indeed the case) that I wanted some stretches of 
everyday interaction ‘to look over’” (1998:72). It is drawn, then, from what is 
characterised as a piece of “mundane … everyday interaction”; that is an episode 
which both Lyn, his colleague, and Charles know as such, for without their 
shared cultural knowledge of what variety of interactional episode constitutes the 
‘mundane’ and ‘everyday’ as opposed to, say, the ‘melodramatic’, ‘spectacular’ or 
‘unusual’, he (and we) would have no data to work with. 
                                                 
7 In passing we note that, once again, here we see the familiar (and, for us, fruitless) 
oppositional binary between ‘culture’ and ‘the self’. Cf. McHoul & Rapley (2005) where 
we argue that anything counting as a ‘self’ is an effect of local, occasioned, socio-cultural 
possibilities. As our argument is strongly anti-psychological in any traditional sense, we 
have to agree with Charles Antaki that neither ordinary speakers nor analysts need 
“psychological” readings of “private meanings” (p. 71). However, this does not preclude 
— in fact, it makes more urgent — the need for a sophisticated conception of culture and 
its operations in and as forms of talk and text. Materials 3: From Antaki (1998: 72-3)8 
(Up till now the videotape has shown Lyn in a domestic interior at a table reading 
and writing for some ten minutes)9 
 
1      ((door? faintly, off camera)) 
2      (6 secs) 
3    Zoe: ((off camera)) Mum? 
4    Lyn: ↑hel↓lo: 
5      (3 secs) 
6    Lyn: I’m ↑he:↓re (..) 
7    Zoe: °o°kay- (..) 
8    Lyn: ((coughs/clears throat)) 
9      ((off camera: three ?crockery bangs for 2 secs)) 
10    (3 secs) 
11    ((door opens, Zoe appears))= 
12  Zoe: =↑hel↓lo↑:: 
13  Lyn: ↑hi:: (.) 
14  Zoe: ↑where’s the ci[gar↓ettes: 
15                   [((Zoe shuts door behind her)) 
16    (1 sec) 
17  Lyn: °in the° ↑kitchen: 
… 
18  Lyn: °in the° ↑kitchen: 
19  (6 secs) ((in which Zoe comes and stands facing Lyn across the table)) 
20  Zoe: °the° ↑camera’s ↓on 
21  Lyn: =y↑e:s (..) 
22  Zoe: are ↓you ↑t(hh)alk↓ing t(h)o it ↑while y(h)ou wO::RK? 
23  Lyn:  ↓n(h)o:: (..) [heh heh- 
24  Zoe:                [hh what (h)ye ↑DO:INg ↓then= 
25  Lyn: =hahh hahh hahh 
26    (1 sec) 
27    ((Zoe starts to move off)) 
28  Zoe: ↓what’s the ↑poin:t: ((moves out off camera towards kitchen)) 
29    (1.5 sec) 
30  Zoe: ((off camera and out of sight of Lyn)) oh ↑g::od (.) look what ↑I’m wear↓ing= 
31  Lyn: =((explosive laugh)) >eheh [hehh hehh hehh< 
32  Zoe:                     [hehh hehh 
33→  Lyn: ↓you ↑look ↓like ↑Fa:↓gin= 
34  Zoe: hahh ha [ha 
35  Lyn:         [ha hahh [↑↑huh ((very high pitched at end)) 
36  Zoe:                  [↑↑hh ↓maybe I ↑am 
37  Lyn: (1 sec) ((in which Lyn starts to mimic pulling gloves on / off)) 
38  Lyn: we ↑just ↓need the ↑little ↓glov:es with the ↑fingers ↓out 
39  Zoe: °↑very funny° 
                                                 
8 Note that the lines marked as 17 and 18 are identical. We have altered some details of 
the transcript so that it conforms more exactly with the standard Jeffersonian notation. 
9 Charles Antaki tells us that in the extracts, which are reproduced as published, the (..) symbols 
were meant to represent pauses of about .5 of a second, and ought not to have been left at the end 
of speakers’ lines; he has an updated transcript, accompanying the videotape of the episode, 
online at <http://www-staff.lboro.ac.uk/~ssca1/trans4.htm> 40    (1 sec) 
41  Zoe: °(d’you want one)° 
 
{{Note to typesetter: 
Please vertically align square brackets marked in blue}} 
 
Perhaps the first point to make about the ascription of the identity Fagin to Zoe by 
Lyn, is that it is part of a side-sequence. The substantive business at hand is the 
filming of ‘everyday life’, with a secondary (and amusingly in the light of our 
invented data) shared activity in the finding of cigarettes. The hunt for the smokes 
begins in line 14 with Zoe’s query about their whereabouts, and is resolved with 
her offering one to Lyn in line 41. All of the material in between is, then, a marked 
departure from the main business of the talk. 
 
Referring to lines 39-41 of the transcript, Charles points out, quite correctly, that 
Zoe receives Lyn’s Fagin remark (about her, Zoe’s, shabby appearance) as jocular 
or playful (1998: 79-80) and that she then quickly moves on to “a different topic”: 
“d’you want one”, i.e., a cigarette (p. 79). What he apparently doesn’t quite see is 
that this is not a “different topic”, but rather is a continuation of the topic left off 
earlier at line 14 — “where’s the cigarettes?”, “in the kitchen”. This shows the 
whole of the passage from “the camera’s on?” to “very funny” (lines 20-39) as 
being marked, by the participants, and for the analyst, as a clearly audible side 
sequence. (Noting that “this stretch is neatly topped and tailed by the 
participants” doesn’t seem quite to capture the import of the sequence grammar.) 
To that extent, what Charles’s sequential analysis under-emphasises is the larger 
sequential status of the Fagin business: it’s done as a side sequence and, thereby, 
specifically not as the main business at hand: recording “some stretches of 
everyday interaction” for Charles “to look over” (1998: 72). 
 
One characteristic of side sequences is that they may ‘formulate’ aspects of the 
context in which the ‘main business’ (here: recording chunks of everyday life with 
a camera) is getting done. That is, side sequences can point to incidental 
contextual features outwith the main business of the talk in hand. They can note any somewhat peripheral features of the scene. Hence Charles’s description of the 
Fagin exchange as jocular or playful. As such, then, we should hear it that, during 
the side sequence, the participants are giving themselves licence to do explicitly 
non-serious work: for example, to mime or to mimic, to make extra-business-as-
usual remarks. In this case, these have to do with being (or not being) suitably 
dressed for an analyst’s loosely pre-specified on-camera event. 
 
Throughout his analysis, Charles seems to equivocate between glossing Zoe’s 
remark “look what I’m wearing” as being a self-deprecation (about being dressed 
shabbily) and as being a complaint (about being caught on camera in such a shabby 
state). Sometimes it counts (analytically) as one, sometimes as the other, 
sometimes as both. Could this analytic hesitation have to do with the side-
sequential nature of the whole exchange? That is, a side-sequence allows its 
makers to engage in things such as self-deprecation and complaining 
interchangeably, non-seriously and, as it were, ‘for a laugh’. The audible 
parentheses around it (“Where’s the cigarettes?”/”In the kitchen” … “Do you 
want one?”) — in Charles’ words, the “top” and the “tail” — as it were, give 
permission, for jocularity and playfulness to be allowed for a while, until the main 
business is resumed. And playing in this way, manifestly for an audio-visual 
recording (as Zoe’s noticing of the camera’s status as “on” in line 20 alerts us), 
might easily occasion a kind of everyday comic art: mocking up a scene from 
elsewhere such as a mutually known novel or film. And so much so given that 
Lyn and Zoe are showing an acute awareness of this event being, in itself, a film! 
 
As a cultural given, side sequences can accomplish just this kind of business. 
(That is, we could imagine a society where they were quite otherwise — e.g., they 
would always refer to members’ deities and nothing else.) And, equally as a 
cultural given, they can accomplish mutual references to ‘extrinsic’ texts. Then, 
especially because the Fagin reference is neither pre-faced nor post-faced with an 
explanation or a request for one, we can hear it that Lyn and Zoe are orienting to a 
mutually known, just-this — not some general — shabby person. It’s Dickens’s Fagin (whether from the novel, the musical or, more likely, from the Alec 
Guinness film incarnation) that is being very specifically alluded to. The allusion 
is a matter of mutual cultural knowledge — just as the use of the side sequence 
itself is such a matter. The symmetry between the two is remarkable. To return to 
a well-known EM noticing, speakers design their utterances for recipients who 
have bits of cultural knowledge in common with them. As Sacks puts it, with 
respect to perhaps the most intimate of such speakers (spouses): ‘A speaker should, 
on producing the talk he does, orient to his recipient’ (1992b:438; his italics). 
 
The question then is: where do the boundaries of what might be called cultural 
information lie? Do they stop at what can be analytically inferred from the 
transcribed text of the talk ‘itself’? Or do they include the EM dictum that 
members should never be assumed to be cultural dopes? If the latter, then we 
would not be surprised if speakers could mutually signal the business at hand 
(here: filming “everyday life”; finding and sharing cigarettes) as ‘on hold’ for a 
short period while they engage in personal banter: jocular or playful talk around a 
fairly-well established cultural icon of shabbiness: Charles Dickens’s Fagin — is 
there another? — and his multi-textual avatars, including Charles’s nominee Ron 
Moody, but also Alec Guinness and, shortly to come, as we write, Ben Kingsley. If 
we, as analysts, have this from both the strictly local context (the transcript) and 
also from a just-slightly supra-local context signed off by the speakers themselves 
as a side sequence, then why not bring both into play? After all, the word Fagin is 
already part of the ordinary language, in perfect logical order as it stands and 
without need of embellishment — as no less than Wittgenstein would have it. 
Chambers, for example, gives us the following entry for Fagin (with a capital 
letter): “a person who trains young thieves, receives stolen goods, etc. [Character 
in Dickens’ novel Oliver Twist]”. In the ordinary language, today, there is not just 
‘Fagin’ but ‘a Fagin’, just as there is ‘a Lothario’, ‘a Casanova’, ‘a Scrooge’ and so 
forth... 
 ...but how far can such contextual information go? There may be an indefinite 
number of predicates attachable to Fagin. And, as one of the reviewers of this 
paper kindly reminds us, a strong candidate is ‘... is a Jew’. Is this either a 
permissible or a useful contextual consideration, given that we have argued that 
context can be available for analysts if and only if it is empricially available for the 
actual speakers themselves? The answer would seem to be a definite ‘no’. The 
only significant predicate — from the indefinite array — for the speakers 
themselves, is something like ‘has gloves with the tips cut out’. Jewishness is a 
contextual matter that is clearly out of the question on these criteria. Dickens 
himself may have had ‘anti-semitic’ motives when constructing the character of 
Fagin: but these speakers are manifestly not repeating anything of the sort. 
Perhaps we can now see, at least to some extent, where the limits of context lie? 
 
So, when Sacks referred to ‘purely’ conversational knowledge, he referred to it as 
a cultural machinery. Does that culture stop with what we can find on the surface 
of a transcript — in which case CA becomes a mere variant of New Criticism 
transferred from the text of the poem to the text of the transcript? If so, a 
computer algorithm yet-to-come would be able to generate every possible 
analysis. Or is the line between culture (as local-textual context) and culture (as 
audio-visually participant-placed supra-local context) more blurred than a certain 
kind of purism would prefer? Our suggested (and slight) blurring allows many 
things into the conversation-analytic mentality as Schenkein (1978) once described 
it: but not everything. It specifically contests analytic inferences to individual 
speakers’ ‘mental contents’; but it also allows ‘short-cut’, but certainly not 
“promiscuous” (cf. Schegloff, 1992) cultural inferences where both analysts and 
participants can be shown, empirically, to depend on them. To say Fagin is to say 
something. And we all, as speakers of the language, have at least a general idea of 
what that (specifically) is — and it’s the same with other ordinary words like 
“you”, “look” and “like” (Antaki, 1998: 80). Here we both agree and disagree with 
Charles. 
 … we have to lead up to it as it comes, as did the participants (Antaki, 
1998: 80) 
 
Furthemore, to say one doesn’t need to know that Fagin is the name of a character 
in Oliver Twist in order to understand that the speech particle is a proper name or 
identity ascription is, surely, not really the substantive point. The utterance 
already contains this information grammatically (we do not have “you look like a 
Fagin”). And of course one does not need to know the ‘contextual’ details of 
Fagin’s dress sense (although, as we have seen, Lyn and Zoe make their extensive 
shared knowledge of this quite explicit), his relation to the Artful Dodger, Nancy 
or Bill Sykes, the particulars of his ethnicity or occupation or even that he was the 
entirely fictional invention of Charles Dickens, to make (some) sense of Zοe’s 
utterance.10 But without this shared knowledge would we see the laughter 
sequentially prefacing and following (indeed latched to) the ascription? That is to 
say, in and through their co-produced laughter, Zoe and Lyn show to us, as on-
looking analysts, that a shared knowledge of Dickens is utterly pertinent 
contextual information for the members in the interaction at hand. In this respect 
then, while one might indeed glean the information that Fagin is an identity 
referential term, and a humorous one to boot, sans ‘context’, the jocular identity 
ascription will be understood to be one, but the specifics of the joke, and indeed 
the meaning of the reference to a very particular type of glove, will not be easily 
got without it — if at all. 
 
That is, the fact, to repeat, that the term Fagin passes without an immediately 
following question (“Who?”) displays mutual recognition within a biographical-
cultural domain. Ditto the fact that it is not prefaced by an explanation (“You look 
                                                 
10 In a context rather remote from the current analysis, we note that the term “need” is 
also a slippery one. That is to say, in human services, persons may routinely be described 
as “needing” the services of a counsellor or psychologist. We note that whilst people may 
well be helped by psychological care or by talking to an impartial other, to say that they 
“need” a psychologist can be too strong. Humans all need to eat. No-one “needs” a Big 
Mac. 
 like a guy I was reading about in Dickens — or saw in the film/musical of the 
novel — who wears those sort of gloves. He was called Fagin”.) Mother and 
daughter mutually and publicly display that they have supra-local (con)text(s) in 
common as members of a cultural order (readers of the English classics, family 
members with knowledge of each other’s reading or viewing habits, and so on), 
precisely by neither post-questioning nor pre-explaining the term in question. The 
purely sequential pertinent absence of such markers shows that something else — 
loosely ‘contextual knowledge’ — is in play, just here, in this local sequential 
scene, as videotaped and transcribed. The specific sequence tells us that ‘our’, ‘for 
here and now’, ‘local’ context is in play and vice versa. As analysts, we might start 
from either end (or indeed from both ends) of this local array of cultural objects 
(utterances including allusions). 
 
When Sacks refers to the conversational machinery that ordinary speakers and 
hearers rely on in order to both produce and recognise particular utterances, he is 
careful to identify it as, equally, both a cultural and a sequential machinery. The 
two need not, of necessity, preclude each other. Sometimes the sequential 
information alone will be the methodological key to what is transpiring in a 
passage of talk. Sometimes the burden can be carried by equally locally obvious 
displays of contextual knowledge on the part of the participants. Sometimes both. 
We can see no in-principle methodological reason for ignoring one or the other. 
The materials, including the locally displayed (if, strictly on the surface of the 
transcript, unspoken) contextual materials, must determine the methodological 
stance we take. Hence, the luxury of context. 
3. Charles (not Dickens) responds 
 
It’s the lucky hack who has his work picked up and scrutinised with such verve 
and brio as do Alec McHoul and Mark Rapley. I’ll respond with what I think is 
the main point at issue between us (though there is, fundamentally, more 
agreement than disagreement in how we see the analytical world). 
 First, a point of agreement, and an example of the sort of analytical bonus that CA 
folk say you get when colleagues look over published transcripts. McHoul and 
Rapley add value by noticing that there is a line of business I hadn’t seen before: 
they point out that Zoe’s enquiring where the cigarettes are, then fetching them, 
then offering Lyn one, forms a frame. I was concentrating on the tease, which 
McHoul and Rapley rightly point out is something like a side-sequence in the 
frame that Zoe implicitly opens, when she comes in and looks around for the 
cigarettes, and closes, when she fetches the packet back from the kitchen. Now as 
it happens, I don’t think the frame is what licences Lyn and Zoe to be jocular (nor 
does it provide evidence that they are so; that comes from the laughter), but one 
could set off on a project to see if side-sequences turn out to be environments 
which allow or privilege jokes and teasing. It’s possible, and an intriguing line of 
further work. But, anyway, for our purposes here: so far so good. 
 
There is trouble, though, in what McHoul and Rapley find me doing with 
‘context’ (and the trouble could have been found with any CA-minded person; the 
analysis in Antaki (1998) being, I hope, a straight exposition of general principles 
as articulated in founders’ writings; the most combative, perhaps, being Emanuel 
Schegloff’s series of articles (Schegloff,  1997, 1998, 1999a,b) in debate with 
Margaret Wetherell (1998) and Michael Billig (1999a,b). 
 
I claimed that Lyn and Zoe’s treatment of the lexical item Fagin showed us all that 
we needed to know. I didn’t quite say so, but I implied that it was shaped by its 
immediate local sequential terrain and, by being set up as a new feature in the 
landscape, it left a new geography for the participants to navigate. In Heritage’s 
useful phrase, it was context-shaped and context-renewing. McHoul and Rapley 
object that I was nevertheless relying (unconsciously) on other clues to what it 
meant and what it was doing, viz: 
 
(a) I was underplaying the fact that Fagin is an allusion to “mutual cultural 
knowledge” (which I share with Lyn and Zoe); (c) I was oblivious to the fact that when both Lyn and Zoe laugh, it “show(s) us ... 
that a shared knowledge of Dickens is utterly pertinent contextual information for 
the members in the interaction at hand”. 
 
I think both of those observations are wrong. The phrase ‘mutual knowledge’ is a 
useful shorthand, to be sure, but it is also a short-circuit. To explain what two 
people do by virtue of their mutual knowledge is circular (they did X because they 
shared this bit of knowledge; we know they share it because they did X). Certainly Lyn 
and Zoe act as if they agree, momentarily, that what Lyn says is funny. What does 
it add to say that they do so because they both know who Fagin is (or still less, that 
they have a 'shared knowledge of Dickens')? I’m not cavilling at the word because; 
I could equally say: what does it add to the statement ‘they laugh because Zoe 
sets up something which she delivers as a joke or tease, in which the term Fagin 
seems to have a natural place’? We don’t know for sure whether Zoe has ever in 
her life even heard of Fagin, or knows he was invented by Dickens.  
 
Certainly there is something of her laugh (when it comes) that does seem to signal 
recognition — but, of course, one could (and, for the sake of epistemological 
propriety, should) simply stop there, and say just that: it signals recognition. Lyn 
may have reason to treat it as actual recognition — I mean the kind which 
commits Zoe to knowing about Fagin, if asked — but Lyn’s interests aren’t ours, 
and her epistemological criteria are different. Lyn might intend to see how much 
Zoe knows about Dickens, Ron Moody, Alec Guinness, the Artful Dodger and the 
rest of the crew; we don’t (until and unless Lyn makes her intention visible). 
 
I'm sure it's happened to all of us that, in the company of people speaking about 
things we're not familiar with, or perhaps in a language we don't fully 
understand, we hear someone make what we work out (from their delivery and 
demeanour) to be a joke; and we laugh. If we are careful about timing, the 
observer can’t tell if we’ve got the joke or not: we laugh appropriately. For the 
observer’s view, we ‘share cultural knowledge’ with our friends, but the observer may have got it wrong. I think Alec and Mark have got it wrong here, for the 
same reason. We can make a good fist of seeing what Lyn and Zoe are up to, 
without either invoking shared knowledge to explain it, nor working back and 
taking what they’re up to as evidence for shared knowledge. 
 
In one of the showstopping numbers in the musical “Oliver”, Fagin instructs his 
boys that “you gotta pick a pocket or two”. You’ve got to slip your hand into a 
hidden place, pull out a valuable, and make off with it for your own profit. I’m 
worried that, in Alec McHoul and Mark Rapley’s lively argument, their appeal to 
‘contextual knowledge’ might just be read as an endorsement of slipping into a 
hidden place (the participants’ minds), stealing a valuable (their shared contextual 
knowledge), and making off with it for our profit (explicating what they are up 
to). Artful: but it dodges the epistemological issue. 
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